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asymmetric information framework. We characterize the decision-making
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about the true state of economic performance. Mis-information can also result in
a legal liability which may depend on probability of losing elections, income, and
attitude to risk. The agency con‡icts between the elected politicians and
career-bureaucrats contribute to the mis-information problem, resulting in poor
policy choices that may lead to poor economic performance. The role of
international …nancial aid ‡ows is examined and the paper argues that such aid
‡ows may only serve to subsidize the ine¢ciencies of political leaders and reduce
the economic gap created by poor policy choices. More …nancial aid ‡ows may
not be a panacea for poor economic growth and its insurance characteristics may
cause recipient governments to choose even riskier policies. We also examine why
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ‡ows to poor regions, such as Sub-Saharan
Africa, are low. We show that the risky policy choices create conditions that
increase the value of the option-to-wait on investment decisions, thus reducing
the ‡ow of FDI. We undertake empirical analysis on some African Countries and
show that the quality of governance in‡uences GDP growth, Employment
Creation, and Poverty Reduction in Africa.
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1 Introduction
Research on causes of underdevelopment traps and economic growth can
be traced back to the work of Young (1928), Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and
Nurkse (1953). The seminal work of Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier
and Tullock (1998), Barro (1991), Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986), re-
vived the debate on causes of economic growth. Later work by Quah (1997),
Salai-I-Martin (1987, 2004) has sought to identify the factors driving eco-
nomic growth across various regions around the world in a manner that
would explain why various regions are growing at widely di¤erent rates. A
stark example is the vast di¤erence in growth rates between African and
Asian countries. Asia was at the same level of development as most African
countries in the early sixties, but has since overtaken Africa in its pace of
economic growth. Explanations and solutions for Africa’s poor growth are
found in the research work by Collier (2004), Berthelemy and Varoudakis
(1996), Berthelemy and Soderling (2001), and Sacks, et al (2004). The “big-
push” initiative, which argues for …nancial transfers in developing countries
and in particular Africa, has been advanced heavily by Sacks et al (2004)
and is also linked to the African Commission Report driven by the British
government, and accompanied by proposals for debt forgiveness for poorer
countries.
Economic analysis intheliteratureindicatesthat (seeSala-I-Martin(2004))
the most important variables that explain economic growth include East
Asian dummy; primary schooling; investment price; GDP; fraction of the
area that is tropical; coastal population density; malaria prevalence; life
expectancy; fraction of the population that is Confucian minded; African
dummy; Latin American dummy; fraction of GDP attributable to mining;
being a Spanish colony; years of pen economy; fraction of the population
that is Muslim; fraction of the population that is Buddhist; ethno-linguistic
fractionalization and government consumption share. These variables turn
out to be the most signi…cant drivers of economic growth out of 67 vari-
ables tested econometrically across 88 countries, using 89 million randomly
drawn regressions. Some of the …ndings recently have included the level of
the …nancial sector development, and institutional factors (see Collier 2004).
The works of Collier and Gunning (1999), O’Connell and Ndulu (2002)
and Devarajan and Reinikka (2004), among others, highlight Africa’s unique
position of being the worst economic performer on the basis of most indica-
tors, even after implementing economic reform programs over the last fewDeterminants of Economic Performance 2
days. The underperformance of Africa is evidenced by capital accumulation,
lowhuman capital accumulation, and loweconomic growthand productivity,
relative to other regions (Van de Walle and Johnston, 1996).
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have also consistently received inter-
national …nancial aid ‡ows over the last few decades, especially the African
region. The African continent has also been notable for civil wars, general
social strife, and outbreaks offamines anddisease, all which have contributed
to the poor quality of life in the region. Of late, arguments have been ad-
vanced for the general cancellation of Africa’ international debt, and for an
increase in …nancial aid. Some African countries have already experienced
debt-forgiveness and partial cancellationunder the Highly Indebted and Poor
Countries (HIPC) program. However, the ‡ow of bene…ts from the HIPC
programs have been questioned in some countries.1 The literature shows
extensive analysis of factors that determine debt forgiveness, which can be
translated as aid in ‡ow. Some researchers including Neumayer (2002), East-
erly (2000), Knack and Dollar (1997), Knack (2001), Brautigam (2000), and
Svensson (1999) have identi…ed the quality of governance as a determinant
of debt forgiveness.
Despite all the …nancial aid that has been directed at regions such as
Africa, sustainable economic growth has remained elusive (Rodrik, 1996).
There has been an attempt to attribute part of this problem to the absence
of good governance, corruption and absence of democracy and its supporting
institutions (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli, 1993).
The aim of this paper is to developa framework based oninformation and
incentive contracts that captures the impact of leadership in government, the
asymmetric information between an elected politician and bureaucrat, and
the role of elections on economic performance. The important role of the
state-owned media apparatus, which controls the ‡ow of public information,
is also highlighted.
The framework gives insights on how international aid can be seen as a
subsidy for the loss of economic performance due to the managerial ine¢-
ciency of government leaders. Perhaps this may explain why international
1In Ghana, where the HIPC ‡ows were about US$ 100 million by 2003, out of an
external debt of about US$6 billion, the incumbent government has been accused by the
main opposition party of directing the resources to the central and southern regions of
the country where most the incumbent government’s supporters reside. Therefore, the
distribution HIPC bene…ts may be skewed.(See Business Report, 7 December, 2004,South
Africa)Determinants of Economic Performance 3
…nancial aid has not demonstrably caused positive economic growth inAfrica
and other poor regions. Even the economic reforms aimed at promoting a
market-driven economic growth environment have not been very successful
in delivering sustainable economic growth in Africa and these poor regions.
Again our framework posits that …nancial aid associated with economic re-
form programs only serves to subsidize and perpetuate ine¢ciency on the
part of government leaders and politicians.
In the paper, we examine why Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ‡ows to
poor regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, are low. We show that the risky
policy choices create conditions that increase the value of the option to wait
on investment decisions, thus reducing the ‡ow of FDI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an
analysis of e¤ort and incentives for leaders, and Section III discusses atti-
tude to risk. Section IV discusses policy choices and links it to economic
performance, and Section V discusses international Aid ‡ows as being linked
to poor policy choices, and indeed act as insurance for poor economic per-
formance. Section VI discusses Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as being
determined by governance issues, and indeed can be seen as being driven by
an embedded option-to-wait. Section VII presents some empirical analysis,
while Section VIII concludes.
2 E¤ort and Incentives for Government Leaders
The political environment in relatively poor regions such as sub-Saharan
Africa is characterized by general dissatisfaction with the leadership com-
bined with an inability to change the leadership easily, due to generally
undemocratic practices of many governments (Ottaway, 1998). Incumbent
governments have a strong grip on power, so much so that either no elec-
tions are held, and if held, they are not free and fair (King and McGrath,
1999). The capacity of the population to change national leadership is ex-
tensively limited (Harbeson and Rothschild, 2001). Sen (1999) has discussed
the importance of democracy in de…ning freedom and its subsequent impact
on economic development. Other authors such as Sala-i-Martin (1997), and
Bloom and Sachs(1998), have highlighted the importance of geography as a
determinant of growth in Africa. Others, such as Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson(2001) and Acemoglu (2002), have posited that geography is a de-
terminant of institutions and income growth and distribution. Bates andDeterminants of Economic Performance 4
Devarajan ( 2000) argue that politics and general competition for power in-
‡uences policy choices. Our approach departs from these authors’ reasoning
but also adds to this literature by explaining the complex nature of develop-
ment and poverty using incentive-compatibility and asymmetric information
arguments in decision-making process for the leadership in the public sector.
We proceed to develop a model that gives a framework for understanding
the agency con‡ict environment at play. In our framework, we assume that
there is an elected government led by a head of state (government), who
then appoints bureaucrats who are responsible for the day-to-day running of
their departments and report to the head of government (the “leader”), on
their activities. The government sets the policy framework, which are then
interpreted and implemented by the bureaucrats, opening upthe relationship
to asymmetric information problems and agency con‡icts.
Let us assume that the government employee (“the bureaucrat”) is an
“empire builder” who always projects a good image, and always reports
good economic performance rather than bad economic performance, using
state-controlled and associated media channels. The leader’s role is to set
the pace for policy-making and then to supervise the bureaucrat, making
sure that they carry out the implementation process and report accurately
on the national economic situation and general state of a¤airs. The lead-
er’s role is to act on behalf of the electorate to ensure that when the state
of the world is bad, either the bureaucrat reports it as bad, or the leader
exposes the incorrect reporting, thereby triggering the possible dismissal of
the bureaucrat. Should the leader politician fail in their role, they stand the
possibility of losing the next election, and the accompanying bene…ts.
Letthe economy havetwopossiblelevels ofeconomic performance, namely
®g for good performance and ®b for bad economic performance. Also b is the
probability that the expected economic performance is bad and bp that the
leader …nds out that the expected economic performance is bad, and bp < b:
Let us consider the preferences of the elected politician, who has their
tenureduringtheperiodinterval f0;Tg, andhasto standfor thenext election
beyond this period. Let W > 0, be the income earned by the politician,
during period (0;Tg. Let F be future income from re-election beyond period
T, that period fT +1;T +N), including bribes. Let " be the e¤ort that the
politician applies in the performance of his duties, D(")be the disutility of
the degree of e¤ort. We also assume that the leader’s preferences U(:) are
separable in money m and e¤ort e, giving utility U(m), so that U(m;") =
U(m)¡ D("):Determinants of Economic Performance 5
Seeing that the bureaucrats are “empire builders” they will report ®g,
signaling that the leader will lose the next election, or trigger a vote of no
con…dence process, if they report ®b. The leader will then report ®b when
they know that ®b is the truthful situation.
Let ®0 be the economic performance at time t = 0, that the leader ob-
serves (O) where O² fg;bg; and ®< be the economic performance at time
t = 0 that the politician reports (R) where <²fg;bg. Let ©(®g=®0) be the
leader’s expected utility when the bureaucrat reports having observed ®<
having observed ®0. Therefore,
©(®g=®g) = U (W + F) ¡ D(") > 0 (1)
where the leader reports good when the underlying state is good, receives his
current income W, future income F, after applying e¤ort, , to perform his
duties, experiencing disutility D(") form e¤ort level,"2.2 Here we assume a
constant level of e¤ort. For the bad state then
©(®b=®b) = U (F) ¡ D(") (2)
and the leader reports bad when the underlying economy is bad, and there
is a risk of losing the next election, or indeed receive a leadership challenge
within their own party and lose their leadership role in government. But by
being truthful they stand a good chance of winning the next election and
earn future income, F, as (2) shows. 3 Also
©(®g=®b) = (1¡ ¢)U (W + F) ¡ ¢U (F ¡!)¡ D(") (3)
where ¢ is the probability of the leader losing the next election, and this
is also the probability of being found out to have been untruthful about
2An example would be Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Britain, who was chal-
lenged for leadership within her own party and lost, and was replaced by John Major in
1990. Also, perhaps the 2004 US Presidential Elections show similar characteristics in
that the Republican candidate George Bush reported the situation as being bad on the
security front, and indeed it was bad, and that may be one of the factors that may have
won him the election against his opponent John Kerry, a Democratic candidate.
3Examples of governments that have portrayed the good performance in their countries,
when in fact performance has been good include those of Botswana, Mozambique, and
South Africa. And indeed the ruling parties behind these governments were re-elected in
Botswana (November 2004), Mozambique (December 2004), and South Africa(May 2004).
All these countries have experienced excellent growth relative to their historical past.Determinants of Economic Performance 6
the real state of a¤airs.4 Basically, equation (3) says that, if the politician
reports good when theunderlying stateof a¤airs is bad, thenhecould survive
dismissal and continue receiving current wages (W) and future income from
re-election, with probability (1 ¡ ¢), with the economy recovering quickly.
Expression (3) also recognizes the possibility of losing the elections with
probability ¢ and only receiving future income, F.
The term ! in (3) is the legal liability of the leader and the general loss
of status from being found not to have been truthful about the true state
of a¤airs. In (3), if we set ! su¢ciently high then the leader will not be
tempted to report good when the underlying state of a¤airs is bad since they
do not wish to risk a high liability. How high should ! be? For incentive
compatibility we require that
©(®g=®b) · ©(®b=®b) (4)
In other words, the politician will experience a lower expected utility from
reporting a good state of a¤airs when the real situation is bad, than from
reporting the true bad state of a¤airs. Being truthful is more rewarding than
being untruthful.
3 Attitude to Risk and Liability of Not being Truthful
The probability of the leader losing the next election ¢ , can be set to be
exogenous in the sense that we can impose it. It may also depend on the
strategy of the rival political leaders. However, we can also set ¢ to be
endogenous in cases where the politician’s actions result in the collapse of a
public corporation, or someother quanti…ablenegative outcome. In this case,
theloss to the public and general taxpayers is quanti…able. Therefore, wecan
showthat ¢ is the probability of the …rst passage time, withinperiod interval
f0;Tg, where the barrier is ! . In the case of endogenous ¢ the liability of
the leader can be calculated exactly using the contingent-claims approach
as we shall show below. Society and legal institutions would be concerned
with identifying the minimum level of liability !1 which ensures that (4)
always holds. Then !1, is the minimum liability that would ensure incentive
4Zimbabwe’s case also presents an example where the real information about the real
state of the economy is not easily veri…able such as for instance information on food
supplies.Determinants of Economic Performance 7
compatible behavior from the politician, and hence reduce the possibility of
untruthful and perhaps corrupt behavior.
What factors determine the liability of untruthful behavior on the part
of leader? We can show that this liability depends on attitude towards risk,
potential future income, and the probability of being found out to have been
untruthful. The probability of being caught being untruthful is also the
same as that of losing the next election. To show this we consider the !
that makes the incentive compatible equation hold with equality and then
substitute equations (2) and (3) in (4). We then consider a Taylor series
expansion about F of U(F + W)andU(F ¡ !), and obtain




¤²(F;F + W) (5)
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and again ¢ is the probability of being found to have been untruthful.
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Then ! depends on being untruthful and losing the next election, ¢;income,
W; and attitude to risk, µ: By inspection of (12) we see that when the prob-
ability of the leader being untruthful being established is high, one expects
the value of ! to increase. When the appetite for risk increases, the liability
!, also increases.5
4 Policy Choices and Poor Economic Performance
We assume that actions of the politicians of not reporting the truth about
the real state of economic performance, often mean the existence of poor
economic performance as measured by low or negative growth in the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). The government and political leadership make
policy choices by targeting a speci…c rate of economic growth, ¹, and the
volatility of the growth pattern, ¾, which are elements of a bigger choice
set S. Hence, the policy choice-set is f¹;¾g²S. The policy choices depend
on the quality of information. Poor information will result in the wrong
policy choices that may produce sub-optimal economic performance, while
the correct information may result in the right policy choices resulting in
positive economic performance.
If GDP at the beginning of the current election period, f0;Tg is Y, then
at any period, t, in the future, GDP can be characterized by the geometric
Brownian Motion process with drift, ¹, and volatility, ¾, given by
dY=Y = ¹dt+ ¾dB(t) (13)
5Some of the political leadership in Africa who are alleged to have been corrupt and
persecuted, after leaving o¢ce, include Frederick Chiluba, the former president of Zam-
bia. Other examples, include the late President of Nigeria , Abacha, who was found to
have bene…ted from corrupt activities and his family’s …nancial assets were eventually
repatriated back to the Nigerian government. Those former leaders who violated human
rights, have experienced a di¤erent form of liability by being sent into exile such, as such
as Colonel Mengistu, of Ethiopia, exiled in Zimbabwe, and Idi Amin of Uganda, exiled in
SaudiArabia, and Charles Taylor of Liberia, exiled in Nigeria. The leaders of Rwanda have
been tried in international courts for genocide crimes, the liability being a jail sentence.Determinants of Economic Performance 9
wheredB is aGaussWeiner process.6 Theterm ¹ is theaverageGDP growth
rate, while ¾ is the standard deviation (volatility) of percentage changes in
GDP. Applying Ito’s Lemma on (14) shows that at any time in future the








Where, Y0 is GDP at time t = 0, and Z » N(0;1). If the policy choice is
based on the incorrect information then, GDP levels could fall from period
t = 0 to any time, t, going forward. Then
Yt < Y0 (15)











If the probability of negative GDP growth is a bad state of a¤airs that
a leader should lose elections over, then this probability is ¢ , as above. In
other words, poor economic performance and the leader’s loss of leadership
havethe same probability, and the converse is true. However, this probability
could di¤er from ¢ if the leader is not found out in the case of having been
untruthful and they retain their job. For simplicity we shall assume the
probability of unsatisfactory economic performance coincides with that of
being dismissed. Then the expected loss in GDP, which also determines the















where ¼(t) is the probability density function for economic performance.
In principle, the loss in GDP to society should be compensated for by
the politicians who would have caused it through negligence and poor policy
6We can also use more complex stochastic processes, such as a Doubly Stochastic
Poisson Process utilized by Asea and Ncube (1998) which captures unexpected shocks in
GDP growth, as would arise from oil-price shocks, say. This however, will not change the
semantic import of our framework.
7We can also set the trigger at some target GDP level Y ¤, and evaluate the expected
loss, replacing Y0 with Y ¤ in equation (17). We can also let Y to be GDP Per Capita or
Income Per Capita.Determinants of Economic Performance 10
choices. Therefore, the liability of political leaders who lie about the state
of a¤airs should be equal to the loss in national income. However, the loss
in GDP is a large monetary …gure which is impractical to pay o¤ for any
individual political leader. Then, who pays for this fall in national income?
In the next section we argue that the compensation, inadvertently, comes
from external …nancial aid ‡ows.
5 External Aid Flows as Compensation for Poor Eco-
nomic Performance
External …nancial aid ‡ows are targeted at bridging the gap between devel-
opment targets, domestic resources of government and to alleviate poverty in
general. However, if government policy and actions result in national income
in the future, Yt, which is lower than the initial income, Y0, the aid ‡ows,
are basically closing the gap between Yt and Y0, or at least the di¤erence
between Yt and a much higher level Y ¤. We can see that aid ‡ows could be
equal to the liability of the politicians. That is
A = L1 (18)
Solving equation (18) using techniques used instochastic calculus yields, the
loss in GDP (which is equal to the politician’s legal liability), and also equal
to aid ‡ows, is given by (see Merton (1977)):
A = L0exp(¡rT)N(¡d2)¡ L0N (¡d1) (19)





T and N(:) is a standardized cumulative probability distri-
bution, with mean 0 and variance 1, and r is a risk-free interest rate.
Aid basically subsidizes the politician’s sub-optimal performance in de-
livering good economic performance. Perhaps, it is not surprising that aid
‡ows to regions such as Africa have not resulted in high economic perfor-
mance in the region because it can be simply a subsidy for politician’s poor
performance, merely closing a national income gap.
Another way would be to view international aid as insurance for politi-
cians for poor performance. Aid insures the loss in national income. It is
as if politicians have bought insurance. Insurance increases moral-hazard on
the part of politicians where they take on more risky policy choices becauseDeterminants of Economic Performance 11
they can resort to aid money for poverty relief. They can even engage in civil
wars and strife that cause food shortages and famine. Donor agencies then
provide rescue by supplying food for the poor.
The expected aid depends on the volatility of GDP growth, ¾: When
the volatility of GDP increases and economic uncertainty rises, the expected
loss in income increases and the amount of aid required goes up. That is
@A=@¾ > 0. Riskier policy choices result in more aid ‡ows being required.
Also the longer the period of o¢ce before the next election the higher the
amount of aid required, that is @A=@t > 0 . This may mean that short
…xed-terms should be introduced to reduce potential economic damage, and
aid requirements.
6 Foreign Direct Investment and Policy Choices
It has been noted in the literature by researchers such as Pindyck (2001),
that if the goal of macroeconomic policy is to stimulate investment then
stability and credibility are far more important for attracting foreign direct
investment than the levels of taxation or interest rates. The importance of
credible policies has also beendiscussed by Ncube et al (1997) in the analyses
ofprogress in macroeconomic reforms inZimbabwe inrelation to trade issues.
They argue that there are questions of policies being time-inconsistent and
also …scally incompatible, risking complete reversal of the reform program,
a phenomenon that is in evidence. Pindyck (2001) also notes that political
and economic instability depresses investment, particularly in least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), which have experienced falling levels of investment
as a percentage of GDP in 1980s. This is in spite of the implementation of
seemingly good economic reform policies, but whose sustainability can be
questioned. This phenomenon has been noted by Dornbusch (1987), and
Van Wijnbergen (1985), in respect of the irreversibility of foreign investment
in liberalizing economies. Therefore, foreign direct investment depends on
factors that are under a government’s direct control.
It follows that the policy choices of politicians in government, on macro-
economic issues, f¹;¾g²S will in‡uence investment returns. Choosinga risky
policy mix increases the value of the option to wait on foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) to regions such as Africa. To fully appreciate the impact of these
policies, let us examine how the option to wait is valued. The revenues ac-
cruing to the foreign investor, are a percentage of GDP,® . Therefore, theDeterminants of Economic Performance 12
revenues, R = ®Y . Then, the mean of the changes in the revenue stream is,
¹ and volatility is ¾ , the same parameters as the GDP stochastic process.
We also assume that, R, is driven by a geometric Brownian process,
dR=R = ¹dt+ ¾dB(t) (20)
where dB (t) is Brownian motion for R which is same as that of GDP, in
equation (14). In other words, a good economy generates good investment
returns as long as the policies for the good economy are sustainable, and the
converse is true.







(R)¡ rV (R) = 0 (21)
where r is the risk-free rate. From Dixit (2001) the solution to (21) is the
value of the option to wait on investment, and is given by
V (R) = BR¯ (22)








What happens when the investment environment risk (GDP volatility),¾ ,
increases? First let us consider the trigger point for investment, H, such that
when revenues R, are equal or exceed H, then waiting ceases and investment
occurs. From Dixit (2001), H is given by
H = r¤K (24)
and
r
¤ = r¯=(¯ ¡1) (25)
where K is the cost of investment, such that H is an “adjusted Marshallian
trigger” for investment. Note that r¤ is an adjusted risk-free rate, where the
adjustment comes from the waiting option scenario.
Notice that as policy risk, ¾2 goes up,¯ falls in (23). When ¯ falls, the
adjusted risk-free rate r¤ increases. An increase in r¤ increases the hurdle H
in (24), making it more valuable to wait longer to invest.
We can see that risky policy-choices increase the value of waiting to in-
vest and therefore, depress FDI ‡ows. This may help explain why FDI has
not risen noticeably in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa in the past two
decades, as has been widely observed in the literature, due to the high-risk
policy environment.Determinants of Economic Performance 13
7 Empirical Analysis
In this section we discuss and test governance factors which e¤ect economic
performance.
7.1 Institutional Factors
We have identi…ed ten (10) institutional factors which capture the quality of
governance, and we present them below.
1. Government to Business Relations
This refers to the ability of Chambers of Commerce and Industry As-
sociations to provide private sector views to government. This would
include other formal mechanisms for government consultations with
business, and use of private sector advisory councils by government, as
well as the use of private-public partnerships in government projects.
2. Human Resources and Entrepreneurship
Another important factor is the availability of educated, trained and
skilled manpower. The availability of institutions for training man-
power and managing it, and general investment in education and sup-
port for entrepreneurship.
3. Financial Infrastructure and Framework
The quality of the …nancial system and the framework within which it
operates is vital for the …nancing of entrepreneurship activities. The
development of capital markets, and stable exchange rates are impor-
tant for engendering a good entrepreneurial environment. The presence
of international standards for accounting and auditing also augur well
for the selection of viable entrepreneurial activities.
4. Reliable Justice System
The protection of property rights and general recourse to an objective
justice system is important for the promotionof private enterprise. The
judiciary should demonstrate independence, competence, and honesty.
Indeed the right environment for private enterprise, excludes political
interference in business.Determinants of Economic Performance 14
5. Corruption Reduction
The prevalence of corruption increases transactions costs and bureau-
cratic delays in the conduct of private business. Corruption should be
tackled in both business and government levels, even by use of legisla-
tion against the bribing of public o¢cials.
6. Corporate Governance Practices
Entrepreneurshipactivity is sustainable if it operatesinanenvironment
with e¤ective corporate governance practices. Corporate governance
has to recognize the rights of all shareholders, and use of independent
directors, for the good of the business.
7. Consistent Policies
Business thrives where government adopt policies which it communi-
cates clearly and implements consistently within a period of time. Pol-
icy consistency creates the environment to make long-term investment
decisions.
8. E¤ective Government
An e¤ective government is one that makes well-considered decisions in
a timely manner. Such a government would also put in place mecha-
nisms for smooth and peaceful transition of power at intervals set by
the constitution. An e¤ective government also creates institutions for
regulatory activities where required, but avoids over-regulation.
9. E¢cient Administration
Most formal businesses require licenses to operate. To attract business
an e¢cient administration is required, to simplify licensing procedures,
investment processes, standards for quality of service delivery, ease of
obtaining information from government departments, and having clear
and non-discretionary procedures for implementing policy.
10. Free Media
Free media activity is a source of information, sometimes free informa-
tion. It is well-known that information is a good and an ingredient for
private business activity. Indeed, the e¢cient functioning of …nancial
markets relies of the ‡ow of information. Therefore, for private en-
terprise to thrive there should be a free media environment. In someDeterminants of Economic Performance 15
African countries the media is not free to operate, and licensing re-
quirements in the media sector are quite cumbersome. In some African
countries th emedia is not free to operate, and licensing requirements
in the media sector are quite cumbersome.
7.2 Correlation and Regression Analysis
In analyzing the impact of the institutional factors that de…ne the business
environment and …nally economic growth, we utilized data from the Com-
monwealth Business Council (CBC).
Data for the institutional factors discussed in section II above, were gath-
ered for the year 2003. Figure 1 below shows each of the factors above for
the African region comprising 14 countries, namely Botswana, Cameroon,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Each of the institutional indicators were added up and averaged the 14
across the countries.
Figure 1 shows the average indicator for each of the 10 institutional factor
averaged across 14 African countries, compared to the UK. In …gure 2 , we
average across ten (10) factors for each country, and present an institutional
indicator for each country.
Botswana has the best institutional environment, followed by Ghana,
both above 3, and fall in my Category A. Cameroon, Namibia, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia have institutional indicators between 2.5 and
3, and fall in Category B. In Category C, with indicator between 2 and 2.5,
we have Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Nigeria. In category D,
below indicator 2, we have Zimbabwe. In terms of this categorization we
expect formal entrepreneurship to thrive in countries in Categories A and B,
with moderate activity in Category C. In Category D, entrepreneurship is
expected to be minimal and indeed fall in activity.
Next, we consider the impact of the institutional factors above on entre-
preneurship and how these factors in‡uence economic growth namely, GDP
growth, employment growth, and general poverty reduction.
First, let us consider the levels of GDP Growth, employment growth, and
poverty levels for each of the 14 African countries discussed above. Figure
3 shows the average GDP growth rates for the 14 countries for the period
1990-2002.Determinants of Economic Performance 16
Mozambique and Uganda, both post-con‡ict economies, show high aver-
age GDP growth rates, followed by Botswana which has been stable political
and economically in the last 50 years. Zimbabwe and Zambia, on the other
hand, recorded low average economic growth.
Next we consider employment growth, another economic growth indica-
tor. Figure 4 shows employment growth rates for the 14 African countries
for the period 1980-2002.
Regarding poverty levels, we consider thepercentage populationthatlives
below US$1 a day for each country. Figure 5 shows the poverty patterns for
13 countries, excluding Uganda where data could not be collected.
Note that Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana and Malawi have poverty levels above
40% while South Africa has the lowest level at below 20%.
Next we analyze the extent to which the three measures of economic
growth, including income distribution, are correlated with the institutional
indicators in Figure 1. Table 1 shows the correlations.
The three growth indicators have reasonably strong correlation with in-
stitutional factors, while income distribution, as measured by the Gini index
for each country, has weak correlation. The implication is that getting these
institutional factors right and implementing appropriate reforms, has the
capacity to improve economic growth, reduce poverty, and generate employ-
ment, but cannot e¤ectively improve income distribution.
Generally, there is meaningful correlation between the ten (10) institu-
tional factors and measures of economic growth, as shown in Table 2, which
con…rms the …ndings shown in Table 1. It would be interesting to run a
multiple regression on these factors. But the problem is that the factors are
correlated among themselves since, to some degree, they re‡ect the quality
of governance in a country.
We ran four (4) regressions across the fourteen (14) African countries,
where GDP growth, Employment Growth, Poverty Levels, and Income dis-
tribution, are the dependent variables, and the explanatory variable is the
average institutional index as shown in …gure 2. Table 3 below shows the
results.
From the simple regression results in Table 3, we can see that the in-
stitutional factors that capture the quality of governance in African coun-
tries, in‡uence GDPGrowth, Poverty levels, Employment growth, but donot
seem to in‡uence income distribution strongly. As the quality of governance
improves, GDP growth increases. As the quality of governance improves,
poverty levels drop, and as the quality of governance improves, employmentDeterminants of Economic Performance 17
growth increases.
8 Conclusion
In the analysis above, we have developed a framework based on information
and incentive contracts that captures the impact ofleadership in government,
the asymmetric information between an elected politician and bureaucrat,
and the role of elections on economic performance, in poor regions of the
world. There are various explanations advanced by empirical studies on
poor economic growth in developing regions, and our framework considers
the role of asymmetric information and incentive problems in the delivery
of services and general economic performance. The empirical analysis of a
limited number of African countries con…rm the importance of governance
issues in determining economic growth, poverty reduction, and employment
creation.
Our framework can be useful inunderstandinghow international …nancial
aid can take the role of a subsidy for loss of economic performance due to
the managerial ine¢ciency of government leaders. Perhaps this may explain
why international …nancial aid has not demonstrably caused positive eco-
nomic growth in Africa and other poor regions. Even the economic reforms
aimed at promoting a market-driven economic growth environment have not
been very successful in delivering sustainable economic growth in Africa and
these poor regions. Again our framework posits that …nancial aid associated
with economic reform programs can perpetuate ine¢ciency on the part of
government leaders and politicians. Indeed, such aid is insurance which in-
creases the moral-hazard problem and may cause leaders to engage in even
riskier policy decisions.
We have extended our analysis to examine why FDI ‡ows to regions
such as Sub-Saharan Africa are low, despite the implementation of economic
reforms. We show that the option to wait increases in value as risk levels
increase in the regions, resulting in low FDI ‡ows.
In the framework developed, we have presented the leader as “sel…sh”,
and as “not-benevolent” with the aim to balance his reward from being in
o¢ce, with those of society, as measured by a social welfare function. Our
framework can be modi…ed to characterize a “benevolent” leader who bal-
ances utility between his own personal gain and a social welfare function, in
making decisions. This is a subject for future research.Determinants of Economic Performance 18
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Journal 38, 527-542.Table 1 : Correlation between Institutional indicators and GDP growth, 
income distribution, poverty levels 
 
Variable Correlation(%) 
GDP Growth %: 1990-2002  30.5% 
Poverty: % of Population below US$1 
a day 
37.4% 
Income distribution: Gini Index  4.3% 







Table 2: Correlation between Institutional Factors with GDP Growth, 
Poverty and Employment Growth for African Countries 
 








Poverty Indicator: % 
population below 
US$1 per day (%) 
Govt to Business 
Relations 
29.3 32.4  16.9 
Free Media  27.1  3  28.6 
Reliable Justice  23.8  23.7  8.2 
Efficient Administration  29.7  27.3  31.4 
Effective Government  35.8  25.4  40.3 
Corporate Governance  19.7  40.8  40.3 
Human Resources  1.9  50  10.9 
Financial Infrastructure  28.7  22  56.4 
Corruption reduction  24.5  24.9  40.6 























 Table 3: Regression Results with GDP Growth, Employment Growth, Poverty 
levels, and Gini Coefficient as Independent Variables, and the Institutional 
Index for each country is the Independent Variable 
 































































 Figure 1: Africa Institutional Factors 2003 
 





















Key: 1: Government Business Relations; 2: Free Media; 3: Reliable Justice; 
4: Efficient Administration; 5: Effective Government; 6: Corporate Governance; 
7: Human Resources; 8: Financial Infrastructure and Framework; 
9: Corruption Reduction; 10: Consistent Policies 


























































































Figure 3: Average GDP Growth Rates for African Countries: 1990-2002 
 





















































































































































































































 Figure 5: Poverty Levels: % of Population living below US$1 a Day 
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